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Introduction
Ireland was one of the countries most seriously affected by the crisis that hit most of the world's developed economies in 2008. Studies of the effects of the crisis commonly view Ireland as among the countries where pay bargaining was decentralized in a disorganized manner due to measures insisted upon by the Troika of the EU Commission, the International Monetary Fund and the European Central Bank. In this paper we present a detailed examination of pay fixing following the crisis and during the equally dramatic economic recovery, drawing on a unique database of pay agreements concluded across the private sector, to which has been added data on prevailing and predicted macro- 
The great recession and changes to pay fixing regimes in Europe
Many changes have been observed in pay fixing arrangements across Europe since 2008. Overall and with few exceptions (Finland being the main one) the long-run trend towards bargaining decentralization evident before the onset of the crisis appears to have accelerated (Aumayr-Pintar et al., 2014; Keune, 2015; Marginson and Welz, 2014; Ribeiro, 2015; Visser et al., 2015; Voss et al., 2014) .
The features associated with this trend are manifold and the degree to which pay-fixing regimes have changed varies significantly across countries. But the main contours of change are clear enough and involve: 1. the collapse in a number of countries of national, cross-sectoral bipartite and tripartite bargaining; 2. the advent of enterprise bargaining where sectoral or territorial bargaining had previously occurred; 3. changes to 'ordering arrangements' between bargaining levels and 'opening' and 'opt out' clauses' that privilege enterprise bargaining; 4. the weakening of erga omnes rules that had extended sectoral agreements beyond the parties involved in their negotiation; 5. the weakening of measures indexing pay to inflation; 6. the granting of rights to parties other than unions to conclude enterprise agreements, and 7. fewer and longer agreements (Aumayr-Pintar et al., 2014; Koukiadaki et al., 2016a and b; Marginson and Welz, 2014; Ribeiro, 2015) .
In this process, employers are considered to withdraw from -and states to withdraw structural supports from -centralized bargaining in order to enhance the ability of employers and economies to respond flexibly to the challenges presented by rapidly changing market and fiscal conditions. As the above list of characteristics suggests, much of this literature, in common with the literature on longer-term trends, associates decentralization with weaker trade unions and less effective union representation and organization. Katz (1993: 12) in his work on the long-term trend in bargaining decentralization, points out that deunionization by employers 'represents an extreme form (perhaps the ultimate form) of bargaining structure decentralization ' and Purcell (1995: 112) identifies a 'relationship between bargaining decentralization and the withering away of trade union recognition. ' While Traxler (1995: 6-7) distinguishes between 'organized' and 'disorganized' decentralization, with negative effects on unions associated mainly with the latter, with the exception of Haipeter's (2011) work on bargaining decentralization in Germany, the argument that unions might benefit from or even prefer decentralization in certain circumstances (also discussed by Katz, 1993: 4) , appears to have gained little traction in the literature. Thus, Baccaro and Howell (2011) , cite evidence of the decentralization of collective bargaining in Ireland and in other European countries in support of the view that national institutional landscapes 'are being transformed in a common neoliberal direction' (Baccaro and Howell, 2011: 522) . Whether or not the changes observed in the Irish case might validly be described as 'neoliberal transformation' is beyond the scope of the current paper, but, as will be shown, they cast considerable doubt on the almost axiomatic linkage of decentralization and trade union disorganization.
The most detailed and wide-ranging study of changes in European pay-fixing regimes concludes that three clusters of countries are apparent in post-crisis Europe. The first comprises six countries characterized by 'multiple changes': Cyprus, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Romania. All countries in this group were party to financial assistance programmes from the EC, ECB and IMF and all were seriously affected by deep and prolonged recession and by sharp fiscal contraction. They were also marked by a significant decline in the coverage of collective bargaining -in large part owing to structural reform commitments contained in agreements attaching to financial assistance programmes (Visser et al. 2015: 10) . So when looked at in a comparative European context Ireland emerges as one of the countries marked by the sharpest discontinuity between pre-and post-crisis pay fixing arrangements: amounting, in the words of Marginson and Welz (2014: 3) , to a 'shift' in the prevalent pay-fixing regime.
While no specific inference is made from cause to effect (but cf. Marginson, 2015) , the import of the analysis nevertheless seems clear: changes in pay fixing regimes in Ireland, in common with other Troika programme countries, are a consequence of externally imposed Troika reforms. In the same way these developments have also been portrayed as a 'frontal assault' on coordinated bargaining in Europe's periphery (Marginson, 2015) . A second cluster of countries comprises cases where 'some changes' have been evident: Croatia, Hungary, Italy and Slovenia, and here domestic adjustments were seen as more important than externally imposed changes. In the remaining 19 EU countries and Norway fewer changes, or 'relative stability' was evident. In these cases the crisis was often less serious in its effects and pay-fixing arrangements adapted to changed economic conditions (Marginson and Welz, 2014:18-19) .
Another significant comparative study focused on developments in collective bargaining and pay fixing in manufacturing in seven countries: Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia and Spain (Koukiadaki et al., 2016a and b) .
These national cases were chosen for study because they were severely affected by the crisis and their labour markets were subject to major regulatory changes at the behest of the EU and other Troika institutions. Manufacturing was the focus mainly because the sector was viewed as 'prototypical': if measures associated with external intervention destabilized pay fixing in manufacturing, where collective bargaining had generally been more robust, they would likely also disrupt pay and industrial relations arrangements more generally in the countries in question (Koukiadaki et al., 2016b: 190) . Three categories of countries are again identified. The Italian case is marked by 'continuity'. In Greece and Romania pre-existing systems are seen as 'close to collapse'. Ireland is located among a group of countries that includes Spain, Portugal and Slovenia characterized by 'erosion'. In these cases state support for multi-employer bargaining had been withdrawn and trends towards 'disorganized decentralization' had been evident (Koukiadaki et al., 2016a: 117-8 and b: 197-8 ).
This leitmotif is evident in the book's Irish contribution, which draws on 5 case studies of collective bargaining in manufacturing firms. Though recognizing some 'features of remarkable continuity' the Irish chapter strongly emphasizes discontinuities, such as a 'dramatic narrowing' of the 'scope and range of issues subject to collective bargaining', a 'fracturing of the regulatory space for industrial relations', the advent of 'patterns of embedded concession bargaining' and 'punitive' labour market reforms in low-pay sectors (Hickland and Dundon, 2016b: 240-47) . These changes are again seen to have been driven by the Troika programme, in conjunction with increased employer assertiveness and what is described as an 'extended neoliberalized state role' (Hickland and Dundon 2016b: 237-9 ).
Contributions to Van Gyes and Scholten (2015) focus directly on the effects of the new European governance arrangements and variously interpret the Irish case as among the countries where 'wage-setting arrangements have undergone the most extensive changes'. In the light of these developments Ireland is classified as akin to a 'Southern Eurozone country' (Keune, 2015: 288; Chagny and Husson, 2015: 311-12) . A second leitmotif involves the serious setbacks suffered by trade unions and their members as a consequence of bargaining decentralization (see, for example, Koukiadaki et al., 2016a: 8; Keune, 2015: 288) . Again this leitmotif is evident in commentary on developments in Ireland that emphasizes 'increased bargaining diversity', the 'punitive' nature of reforms and the 'dramatically narrowing' scope and form of collective bargaining (Hickland and Dundon, 2016b) .
What follows challenges these interpretations in significant ways by showing that pay bargaining in Ireland after the crisis was subject to what we will refer to as 'orderly decentralization' and then to a new form of coordination based on pattern bargaining in the private sector (including state-owned commercial utilities) and sectoral bargaining in the public services. It will be shown that these developments were shaped less by punitive conditions or external diktats imposed by the Troika than by internal moves by unions, employers and the state to respond to dramatically changing economic and fiscal conditions. It will also be shown that pay cuts and freezes had effectively ended in the private sector by 2011 and that there was little correspondence between pay increases and plant-level concessions. Finally it will be shown that far from assessing new pay bargaining arrangements in negative terms, union leaders saw significant opportunities in coordinated pattern bargaining and also showed little interest in returning to centralized pay coordination of the type that prevailed under social partnership.
Research methods
The paper deploys qualitative and quantitative data to examine the impact of the crisis and recovery on pay coordination in Ireland. Our review of the collapse of social partnership draws on secondary sources and reports by the parties directly involved. Our examination of decentralized coordinated (pattern) bargaining draws on three sources of data. The first of these comprises detailed reports carried in the specialist weekly periodical, Industrial Relations News proposals. These are also used by IRN to compile and publish regular comprehensive and detailed listings of pay deals recorded each year. As the same collection and reporting format has been used by IRN over the period as a whole, the trends identified from these reports provide a reliable indicator of the changing incidence and features of pay deals. IRN data on pay deals were supplemented by databases and lists of pay deals made available by SIPTU's manufacturing division, by Mandate (retailing) and by the FSU (financial services). As IRN also draws on these sources, they were useful in the main for providing additional details of the dates when deals were signed and came into effect, although some additional pay deals were also identified from these sources. While we should enter the caveat that we make no claim to have developed a complete inventory of pay deals negotiated since 2011, we are confident that these data sources in combination provide the most comprehensive, valid and reliable profile of pay bargaining available for unionized employments in the private and state-owned commercial sectors since the advent of economic recovery in 2011. 1 The deals cover bargaining units ranging from less than 10 to 30,000 union members. 2
The orderly decentralization of pay bargaining in Ireland
One of the first casualties of the crisis in Ireland was the 22-year social partnership model, which collapsed in 2009. Since 1987, employers, unions and governments had been party to a series of seven social partnership programmes that contained agreements on pay rises across unionized sectors of the Irish 1 A range of other sources on developments in pay provide useful external benchmarks against which the validity and reliability of the dataset used in the paper can be checked. Regular surveys of member firms conducted by the Irish Business and Employers' Confederation (IBEC), show an annual pattern of pay rises consistent with that reported in the paper and also show average annual pay rises similar to those we report (see IBEC 2016; Roche 2016: 196) . Surveys of developments in pay reported by HR managers, conducted by IRN in conjunction with the Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development also report similar trends to those reported here (IRN & CIPD 2017; . 2 It should be noted, however, that reliable data on numbers covered by pay deals were often unavailable. The median size of bargaining units for which numbers of union members are recorded is 120 union members.
economy as well as a national minimum wage and a range of fiscal, economic, industrial and social policy commitments (Baccaro and Simoni, 2007; McDonagh and Dundon, 2010; Roche, 2007; Teague and Donaghey, 2009 firms and unions were also enjoined to resolve disputes through established procedures (ICTU and IBEC, 2010) . The protocol provided a framework for a highly orderly decentralization of collective bargaining across the private sector and state-owned commercial utilities.
There were parallel developments in the public sector. Faced in 2009 with impending economic and fiscal collapse, the government imposed a levy on public service pensions (O'Connell, 2013) . This was followed in early 2010 by a unilateral cut to salaries. In the face of incipient public service union militancy and threatened work stoppages, public service employers and unions concluded a new agreement in March 2010. This contained measures to reform work practices and promote labour mobility within and across agencies with a view to delivering public services with significantly fewer staff. In return, the unions obtained pledges that there would be no further pay cuts and no compulsory job losses (Labour Relations Commission, 2010) . Against the background of slower than anticipated fiscal recovery, a second agreement in 2013 involved pay cuts for public servants earning in excess of €65,000 (Roche, 2016) . Existing reform measures were retained and working hours were increased (Labour Relations Commission, 2013) . The public service agreements were aptly portrayed by a union official as providing a framework for the 'managed retrenchment of the public service' (Roche, 2013) . As economic and fiscal recovery gathered pace, a third public service pay agreement, concluded in 2015, provided for the partial and phased restoration of public service pay (Labour Relations Commission, 2015) .
As in the private sector, the rapid shift to a more decentralized form of coordinated bargaining in the public service proved remarkably orderly.
Although public service unions were divided over the pay and other concessions contained in the agreements, little industrial conflict resulted from the reconfiguration of pay fixing arrangements and cuts that ranged from 8 per cent to 21 per cent across the lowest to the highest paid public service grades (Roche, 2016) .
Concession bargaining 2008-2010
Over the period from late 2008 to 2010 collective bargaining was dominated by concession bargaining. The two public service agreements manifestly involved unions trading work practice changes and then pay cuts for pledges that no involuntary job losses would be imposed. In the private sector, unions most commonly bargained to retain jobs and to moderate employer proposals for pay cuts. Given the scale of the economic collapse little scope existed for pay rises in other than the most resilient and profitable firms ). Yet internal devaluation involving widespread cuts in nominal pay was avoided (Barrett and McGuinness, 2012; Bergin et al., 2012; Doris et al., 2014; Roche, 2016; Walsh, 2012) . Attempts by groups of employers to rescind statutorily extended collective bargaining through constitutional challenges in the courts were confined to hotels and catering and parts of construction. While these led to the suspension of sectoral pay fixing across low-pay industries and construction, they were later reversed by amendments to statutes.
Pattern bargaining 2011-2016
From 2011 the Irish economy began to stabilize and then recover dramatically.
GDP grew modestly in the years up to 2013 and then more significantly from 2014, when annual GDP growth exceeded 5 per cent. Having peaked at 14.7 per cent in 2012, unemployment declined to 7.5 per cent in 2016 (CSO, 2016; ESRI, 2015) . Pattern bargaining first emerged in 2011 as economic decline bottomed out. Pattern bargaining is widely understood in the literature as a form of coordinated collective bargaining in which unions seek to 'achieve the same or related outcomes in separate negotiations' (Sisson and Marginson, 2002: 199;  and see Cappelli, 1990; Ibsen, 2016; Meyer, 1995, and Traxler et al., 2008) . This form of pay fixing, which has no direct precedent in Irish industrial relations, became increasingly pervasive over subsequent years. The genesis of pattern bargaining was in the strategic targeting by SIPTU's manufacturing division of employers in commercially buoyant export sectors such as pharmaceuticals, chemicals, medical devices and food processing to reestablish pay rises after some three years of concession bargaining. The pattern from the start was for deals averaging around 2 per cent per annum, matching or exceeding the trend in inflation (Industrial Relations News, 24 November 2011). Initially pay deals were confined to small numbers of firms in the targeted sectors that were heavily focused on exporting. The incidence of deals grew as the economy revived.
SIPTU claimed that pay agreements soon extended to the great majority of members working in the target sectors and to food firms, where fewer members were initially involved (Industrial Relations News, 17 April 2013, 9 July 2014). As recovery gathered pace, pay bargaining spread progressively beyond exportoriented sectors into engineering, retail multiples, construction supply, extractive industries, some banking groups and commercial state-owned firms.
The duration of deals varied from 1 year to up to 5 years. Most agreements were of 2 to 3 years duration, and a gradual rise is observed in the average length of agreements.
2 per cent became an informal norm for collectively bargained pay agreements and also became the benchmark for pay rises in non-union firms (IBEC, 2015; IRN and CIPD, 2016) . The 2 per cent norm was adhered to by the main general, craft and sectoral unions, especially SIPTU, TEEU and Mandate: 2 per cent being judged affordable by many firms and thus capable of gaining traction beyond relatively buoyant exporting companies. The 2 per cent norm was regarded by unions as providing for both earnings and employment security while also preserving competitiveness. Unions sometimes described 2 per cent deals as 'pay and stability agreements'. The 2 per cent target was influenced in part by pay rises in countries with strong export performance, as well as in the German chemicals industry and more generally across the German economy. A key SIPTU official involved in setting the 2 per cent target also took account of the ECB's inflation prediction (Industrial Relations News, 23 July 2015):
It was in the pharmaceutical, chemical and medical devices sector where we started, which is the sector least impacted by the crisis and probably [where] profits increased during the crisis rather than going down. … The second part of it then was we used the pay rates across Europe, across similar unions as ourselves, running at around 2 per cent, through the German Metalworkers' Union. … And then the third thing was the ECB target was 2 per cent inflation, so we used that.
Firms were offered local flexibility to tailor the duration of agreements to commercial and market conditions. Most agreements made pay rises conditional on 'cooperation with normal ongoing change' and some contained specific productivity measures. day-long work stoppages, the Labour Court intervened and issued a recommendation for a significant improvement in pay and conditions, which was accepted. Another union outside the public service agreement, the secondary teachers' union, ASTI, also engaged in industrial action. While both disputes were widely regarded as direct challenges to the public service pay agreement, the Labour Court's recommendation in the Garda disputes was viewed by public service unions within the agreement as a significant change that had advantaged groups outside the agreement. The coordinated approach to public service pay was preserved by the government and the Public Services Committee of the ICTU resolving the 'anomaly' created by the Garda settlement by bringing forward to April 2017 a €1,000 pay increase originally due to be paid to most public servants in September. Talks on future developments in public service pay are due to begin around the middle of the year, while the ASTI remains outside the current agreement.
Accounting for the durability of pay coordination
Overall a key feature of the conduct of post-crisis collective bargaining in Ireland was the highly orderly way in which unions and employers had shifted collective bargaining to firm level in the private sector and to sector level (further differentiated across grades and occupational categories) in the public service.
Financial rescue measures and new economic governance
The literature reviewed earlier views the EU and the Troika institutions as the main instigators of 'disorganized decentralization' in the countries that availed of financial support programmes (Hickland and Dundon, 2016a; Koukiadaki et al., 2016a and b; Marginson and Weltz, 2014; Van Gyes and Schulten, 2015) .
The sequence in which changes occurred in the conduct of collective bargaining in Ireland reveals that employers, unions and government were the main agents of post-crisis adjustment to pay fixing. Ireland was forced to agree a financial assistance programme with the Troika in late 2010 after the European Central Bank threatened to withdraw liquidity support to the Irish financial system (Kinsella, 2016; Laffan, 2016) . By then social partnership had already collapsed.
Reductions in the public service pay bill and employment had also been determined, and the measures involved were simply included in the Memorandum of Understanding agreed with the international institutions (Department of Finance, 2010).
Pay decentralization in the private sector also preceded the Troika programme, which had little effect on pay fixing or collective bargaining, other than in low pay industries and construction. The direction of reform in these sectors -where Joint Labour Committees and Registered Employment Agreements fixed legal minimum pay rates and other conditions of employment -was outlined in the Troika programme. The issue was delegated however to an independent review.
The review was completed in 2011 and proposed some procedural reforms of the prevailing pay fixing arrangements and greater scope for employers to derogate from legally prescribed minimum pay rates (Duffy and Walsh, 2011) .
The subsequent collapse of pay fixing arrangements in low-pay sectors and construction followed judgments by the High Court in 2011 and Supreme Court in 2013 in constitutional challenges by groups of employers in catering and construction (Turner and Walsh, 2014) . Significant employer opposition to legally backed sectoral pay fixing arrangements predated the economic crisis; a High Court challenge to pay fixing in the hospitality sector had been mounted in
2007.
Ironically, in the Irish case it is necessary to consider the converse argument to that posed in the literature: whether the EU's new economic governance regime may have played a role in the emergence and durability of coordinated pattern bargaining. As discussed, the ECB's inflation prediction and the pattern of pay rises in Germany were taken into account by SIPTU in devising the 2 per cent strategy. This might suggest that the policy stipulations and monitoring provisions associated with the European Semester that began in 2011 directly impacted on the genesis of pattern bargaining. The 2 per cent pay norm and the pay-moderating effect of pattern bargaining were certainly consistent with the EU's macro-economic policy stipulations and the objectives of the macroeconomic imbalance programme (MIP) (Marginson and Weltz, 2014) . However the 2 per cent strategy had not been devised to align with the new EU governance regime. None of the union officials interviewed made reference to or showed any awareness of the new EU governance or MIP stipulations, perhaps reflecting that union involvement in the EU Semester was limited at both national and European levels (Sanz et al., 2016) . Moreover from 2011 to 2013
Ireland remained exempt from the EU regime, and was instead subject to the stipulations of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) agreed with the Troika (Marginson and Weltz, 2014: 28-33 
The logic of decentralized coordination
The genesis of pattern bargaining was rooted in union attempts to reinstitute pay increases by negotiating pay rises in a cluster of pharmaceutical, chemical and medical devices firms in which they were well organized and remained profitable after the onset of the crisis. The 2 per cent pattern took effect gradually across a widening range of firms and sectors as economic recovery gathered pace. The negotiated pay rises preserved or improved real pay and safeguarded employment: hence unions' preferred label of 'pay and stability agreements' to describe the deals (Industrial Relations News, 9 January 2013).
The 2 per cent pattern gained pragmatic acceptance by employers, surveys by employer associations suggesting that 2 per cent had become a benchmark for pay rises in unionized and non-union firms (IBEC, 2015) .
In contrast with the themes in the literature on disorganized decentralization and its effects, the union officials interviewed emphasized the benefits of decentralized coordinated bargaining, often contrasting these with the effects of national social partnership.
… workers thought that those pay increases came to them from the government, they still refer to them as the government pay increases […] . 'The government gave me that.' That came out of your social partnership model but it was a cocoon. (Mandate Official) … this is the problem I had with national wage agreements; it was never viewed as being the unions getting you the increase. 'We got the government increase, what's the union doing for us?' So for the union to be relevant you need to get your hands dirty. (FSU Official) Organization has improved; people are getting involved more. They see the union as being a useful tool for them in their own employment, whereas the old [social partnership] system was, well it was a government increase you know, the old story with the national wage agreement. That was the most negative part of them. Of course the official [now] has to go into each employment, meet the workers. (SIPTU Official) Aligned with these views was a marked reluctance to countenance a return to centralized pay bargaining.
Our unions are very nervous about the idea of any sort of structured national pay agreement at this point in time. Because the unions feel that we have had five or six years of no or little opportunity, where in a lot of employment there is [now] a real possibility of getting not only pay progression but getting some of the pay that people lost in the period between 2008 and 2013. Why should we have something at a national level that constrains people from doing that work? (ICTU Official)
The shop stewards go in and negotiate directly with the employer. Our members ballot on their own agreement and generally speaking, where it's accepted, we're talking about 65-70 per cent acceptance rates -very high levels. (SIPTU Official)
The Unite union (and its precursor unions in Ireland) had always opposed national pay agreements and social partnership, so this union's endorsement of the 2 per cent pattern bargaining strategy is less surprising. Nonetheless, the union's emphasis on the benefits accruing from decentralized co-ordination echoed that of other major unions:
The real crucial part, we think, is having workplace reps across the sector involved, throwing their tuppenceworth into it: 'this is what the order book looks like; this is what the parent company might be saying'. … We're not going around as sort of bandits raiding the place, you know, the minute there's a few euro profit we're in to clobber everybody, because I think the workplace representatives understand what you need to engage with … and that you copper-fasten your longterm security. (Unite Official)
Unite had shifted to a more sector-focused model of representation, allowing it to take advantage of the new bargaining environment and also focused its own early bargaining on major firms to set a pattern for deals with other employers.
In part, these views on the advantages for unions inhering in firm-level pay bargaining reflect the legacy of workplace industrial relations under social partnership. Social partnership accorded limited scope for workplace representatives or workplace mobilization and organization. Overall little second-tier pay bargaining or pay drift occurred in workplaces under social partnership and sectional union pay claims were contained in the private and commercial state-owned sectors by the parties to the centralized pay agreements (Higgins and Roche, 2014; Roche and Higgins, 2016) . Unions sought to institute 'workplace partnership' arrangements in line with framework agreements in several of the social partnership programmes, but with limited success (Roche and Teague, 2014) . Attempts to widen trade union recognition and representation on the same basis by offering of 'partnership' in the workplace were also generally rebuffed by employers (D'Art and Turner, 2005) .
The new SIPTU-initiated pay strategy accommodated the varying negotiating priorities of unions in different sectors. In retailing, Mandate adopted the 2 per cent pay norm while prioritizing earnings stability by seeking to negotiate 'banded working hours' with employers -where members were guaranteed weekly working hours by occupying one of a series of bands. This had been a long-term union objective in an industry where part-time work and 'as and when required' working hours arrangements had become prevalent. So it's easy to say 2 per cent deals, or whatever… . But we also had to factor in the increase in the hours [sought] and stabilization of those weekly hours. That's in itself an increase for workers. A much more significant increase than a 2 per cent pay increase would be for a retail worker who is on variable hours and at low levels of hourly pay. (Mandate Official) In the same way, in the crisis wracked financial services sector, the FSU initially sought to prioritize job retention and influence the restructuring and rationalization of the major commercial banks. The union's insistence that contractually agreed pay rises (increments and bonuses) continue to be paid led to a deal that, in the words, of a senior official, 'created the avenue' to pay bargaining. From 2011 FSU concluded 2 per cent pay deals in a number of major banks, while accommodating the insistence of employers that pay increases in the future should mainly reflect individual performance. FSU agreed a 'two-pot bargaining' model that combined a modest general increase with performancebased increases.
We want two-pot bargaining, whether it's increments or whether it's progression or whether it's performance; whatever it is. We also want recognition for cost of living. So scales go up, whether you don't perform or not you get an increase, but you differentiate on the back of performance. We're anti performance-related pay, anti performance management. But we're realists; it's there; it's not going away.
By gaining oversight of the distribution of members across performance categories, the union was able to ensure that the majority of members achieved annual pay rises of at least 2 per cent. The union was also flexible in accommodating employers' preferences regarding the length of deals provided that the 2 per cent minimum pay increase was conceded.
If strategic considerations linked to reinstituting pay increases and calibrating these to preserve competitiveness, jobs and union influence were prominent features of pattern bargaining, the capacity of unions to co-ordinate this mode of pay bargaining was also an important influence. Little pay coordination had been evident during previous cycles of decentralized pay bargaining in Ireland. A prominent theme in portrayals of 'pay rounds' during the 1960s was the role of inter-union competition and conflict in the genesis of the 'key wage bargains' in the sheltered construction sector which triggered a number of pay rounds (McCarthy et al., 1975) . While the theme of inter-union competition was muted in commentary on pay rounds during the 1980s, there were few indications of strategic or coordinated bargaining by unions, and such coordination as occurred appeared to take the form of general guidelines, issued by the ICTU, on factors that should influence pay targets, especially inflation. Once established through collective bargaining, the 2 per cent norm was further institutionalized through Labour Court recommendations in pay disputesunions refraining from referring disputes to the Court until the norm had become widely established at firm level (Industrial Relations News, 7 January 2015) . SIPTU planned to establish the norm through deals with individual employers in the first instance, and only then to bring cases to the WRC and the Labour Court … our strategy was not to use the State agencies at all and we didn't. Our plan was to go to the companies that we knew would pay up if we put a reasonable argument to them […] it gave them stability and it was going to be a reasonable pay increase. It wasn't going to be outlandish regardless of the profitability of the company.
[…] So we built up; we started this database that you have in front of you; so we recorded everything we were doing and we decided we'd build it up till we got as close to 50 agreements as we possibly could and then we would go public. (SIPTU Official) Once the norm was an established feature of pay bargaining, it was effectively 'informally rubber stamped' by the Labour Court (Industrial Relations News, 16 June 2016). In fact, so well established had the norm become over the period that only about 15 per cent of pay deals in 2015 and 11 per cent in 2016 involved disputes that were referred to the WRC or the Labour Court -a rate of referral that remained in line with the pattern since 2011 (13 per cent), in spite of strong economic growth in the latter years of the period. Unlike conflict resolution agencies in some European countries, such as Denmark and Sweden, the Labour Court does not participate in orchestrating pattern bargaining (Ibsen 2016) .
Nevertheless the Court contributed to institutionalizing pattern bargaining by issuing recommendations that took account of the going rate of pay rises.
Beyond the advantages of coordination for unions and institutional legacies and supports for the process, the resilience of coordinated bargaining also reflected wider features of the political economy of industrial relations in Ireland that survived the enormous shocks delivered by the economic, financial and fiscal crisis. In its aftermath, employers in Ireland refrained from any frontal onslaught on unions or collective bargaining (Roche and Teague, 2015) . This reflected a long tradition of pragmatism by the majority of employers and their associations: having withdrawn from national bargaining, firms in general were able to achieve concessions on pay and work practices without resorting to any radical change of posture or approach in their dealings with unions (Roche and Teague, 2015) . This meant that the infrastructure for collective bargaining remained intact when unions regained enough confidence and power to push for pay rises. Employers were disinclined to ignore or challenge norms established in other firms or sectors in favour of firm-specific arrangements; and, in any event, pattern bargaining afforded them considerable flexibility to seek productivity concessions and to conclude deals of varying duration. The Director General of IBEC has supported a 'coordinated approach to pay determination', in which enterprise-level bargaining remained appropriate for the private sector and a 'coordinated centralized approach' continued in the public service, ensuring that private sector pay rises were in line with productivity and to prevent public service pay pressure from spilling over into the private sector (RTE, 2016) . If coordinated bargaining breaks down in the dramatically changed economic circumstances of recent years, this will be due to sectional trade union pressure on pay rather than to any determination by employers or the state to secede from, reconfigure or undermine collective bargaining arrangements. Moreover the consequence will be a reversion to a pay-bargaining cycle familiar during the 1980s, rather than any further hollowing out, or contraction of, collective bargaining.
The import of the analysis presented here extends beyond the Irish case to comparative accounts of the effects of the Great Recession and associated reforms in European Governance. The crisis literature implies that the effects of disorganized decentralization are progressive and may ultimately hasten the 'decollectivization of labour relations' (Koukiadaki et al., 2016b: 200) 
